The Methodology behind the Tigray Genocide Inquiry Commission’s Findings

The Tigray Genocide Inquiry Commission (CITG) was established by the Tigray Interim Administration in May 2022 amid the turmoil of the northern conflict to document and investigate human rights violations and damage caused by the two-year war.

Over the past few months and as part of the first volume of its findings, the Commission has published a number of reports detailing the extent of economic loss, environmental destruction, sexual and gender-based violence, and the overall human toll of the conflict.

In this interview with The Reporter’s Nardos Yoseph, Tadele  (PhD), an environmental researcher at the Commission, discusses CITG’s findings and shares insight into how the research is being conducted, the challenges of data collection in a region still struggling to recover from war, and how environmental devastation connects to the broader question of genocide. EXCERPTS:

‎The Reporter: The Commission began publishing its findings in recent months, more than three years since it was first established. Its studies cover multiple areas — environment, economy, violence, and genocide. Could you describe the scope of these studies, including those behind the environmental degradation report published this month ? How does the Commission handle eligibility for these specialized assessments, and what are your standards, methodology, and human resources like?

CITG Researcher: Our approach is strictly scientific. Within the Commission, we have professionals specialized in environment, natural resources, natural resource economics, wildlife management, and soil science and others. Most hold master’s degrees, and several, including myself, have PhDs.

‎We are organized under the Environment and Natural Resource Research Center, which operates as a formal research institution under CITG. When we say scientific procedures, we mean we follow methods that are based on available data, verified through fieldwork, and consistent with environmental research standards.

‎Our work is transparent and structured. For instance, when we assess forestry in an area, we start at the community level. We take what we call a forest sample—a 25-meter-radius plot. Within that radius, we measure, catalog, and compare pre-war and post-war conditions. We determine what species existed before, what remains, and what has been lost. This helps us identify the extent of environmental degradation scientifically.

The Commission began its work amid the war and has been operating through the different phases of conflict and its aftermath. Considering those conditions, how do you evaluate the progress so far?

‎As the reports and technical documents explain, the scope of our study is defined in two main ways: geographical scope and temporal scope.

‎Geographically, the study is limited to areas under the control of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray. That means regions such as Western Tigray, parts of the northeast, and some eastern zones, including areas stretching from Shire to Tselemet, are not covered because of ongoing security concerns. Those areas remain inaccessible to our teams.

‎Temporally, our study covers the period between late 2020 and 2023, essentially from the start of the war up to the signing of the Pretoria Agreement. Anything that happened afterward, including further incidents or recovery efforts, is not part of Volume One.

‎So, this report should be read with those boundaries in mind. It’s the first in a series, and both its time frame and geographic focus are clearly defined.

Reports indicate that most of CITG’s researchers work voluntarily. But given the scale of this study, and the massive amount of time, resources, and fieldwork it requires, how are your human resources managed in practice?

That’s true; most of the work is voluntary. But voluntarism, in this context, has two dimensions.

‎The first is professional voluntarism. Many of us have worked in environmental fields for years, each of the professionals involved in the studies are serving in their own respective profession. As professionals, we see documenting this destruction not as charity but as a responsibility; a duty. The environmental and social damage we witnessed required documentation. The second dimension is institutional voluntarism. The Commission itself does not have unlimited funds, and unlike some international investigative bodies, we do not receive large external grants. However, our commitment to public accountability drives us to work with limited means. We use what we have—our expertise, our networks, and our access to regional and community institutions.

‎We coordinated with local bureaus of environment, agriculture, and water resources, as well as with universities in Tigray. Through these partnerships, we were able to gather satellite data, conduct field visits, and cross-check information from multiple sources. Despite financial constraints, the integrity of our data is not compromised.

‎In one report, CITG emphasized soil degradation and water contamination as one of the most severe outcomes of the war. Can you explain how these were measured and what scale of damage the Commission found?

Soil degradation was one of the earliest and most visible impacts. Using soil samples and GIS-based land-use data, we identified erosion, loss of fertility, and contamination from explosive residues.

‎In specific zones such as central Tigray, especially around Adi Haki, Aksum, and Tembien, we found that vast agricultural areas were stripped of topsoil due to bombardment, trenching, and vehicle movement. The soil structure in many places has been destabilized, making immediate agricultural recovery impossible without long-term rehabilitation.

‎As for water, the situation is equally alarming. We collected samples from more than 100 wells and streams across the region. Laboratory tests confirmed contamination by heavy metals, mainly lead, cadmium, and mercury, linked to artillery fragments and the burning of military equipment.

In our report, for example, we note that water sources in Adwa and Shire contained lead concentrations exceeding the WHO’s safe limit by up to eight times. In some cases, the contamination was so severe that nearby communities were advised not to use local water for drinking or irrigation.

‎The report also mentions biodiversity loss and damage to protected areas. What did your findings show in this regard?

Indeed, biodiversity suffered immensely. Our surveys in Dedebit, May Tsebri, and Hawzen show that entire wildlife corridors have been disrupted. The conflict caused deforestation, poaching, and habitat destruction at unprecedented levels.

‎For instance, we document that nearly 18,000 hectares of forest cover were lost in the first two years alone. Several bird species once common in the Tigray highlands have largely disappeared from observation zones.

‎We found evidence that military operations used forest areas as hideouts, and troops deliberately set fires to clear vegetation. These fires spread beyond control, destroying both ecological and agricultural land.

‎In short, this is not just a humanitarian crisis, it’s an environmental catastrophe with long-term consequences for livelihoods, climate resilience, and biodiversity.

‎Some have argued that environmental damage, while serious, should not be part of a genocide inquiry. Why does the Commission link the environment to genocide?

‎That’s a very important question. Many assume genocide only refers to the killing of people. But international law, including the UN Genocide Convention of 1948, recognizes that genocide includes acts designed to destroy the life-supporting systems of a group.

‎In our case, the deliberate destruction of the environment was used as a weapon of war. When you burn crops, poison wells, and destroy grazing land, you are effectively targeting a people’s survival.

‎So, our mandate goes beyond counting casualties. We investigate the destruction of means of existence, that is, the conditions that sustain life. When farmland is rendered infertile or water becomes undrinkable, it’s not just environmental degradation; it’s a systematic act that contributes to genocide.

‎That’s why, in our report we treat environmental destruction as an integral dimension of genocidal intent.

‎Let’s talk about methodology again. How do you ensure the credibility of your findings, especially given the sensitivity of these claims?

‎Our methods combined scientific sampling and forensic documentation.

‎We collected data from multiple sources to detect changes in vegetation, soil moisture, and land cover before, during, and after the conflict. This allowed us to verify local testimonies objectively.

‎We also used comparative field surveys. For every damaged site, we identified a control site with similar ecological features but outside the conflict area. The differences were then analyzed statistically to isolate war-related impacts from natural variation.

‎Finally, we triangulated our data with eyewitness interviews, administrative records, and visual documentation, including photos, and video footage.

‎All of this is explained in detail in our report. Transparency was our guiding principle. We want future researchers and prosecutors to replicate or challenge our findings scientifically.

‎Did you collaborate with international bodies or environmental agencies in conducting these studies?

We had informal technical exchanges with several organizations, but the core research was fully CITG-led.

Mekelle University and other regional institutions provided reference materials and assistance. However, data collection and interpretation remained under the Commission’s control to preserve ownership of the investigation.

‎We also compared our results with post-war environmental reports from other conflict zones to understand patterns of ecological warfare. The similarities are striking.

‎The report mentions the economic cost of environmental damage. How was this estimated?

‎We applied a combination of valuation methods, primarily contingent valuation, replacement cost, and production loss analysis.

‎For example, we estimated the soil restoration cost per hectare using Ethiopian agricultural benchmarks.

‎If we include destroyed irrigation systems, water infrastructure, and forest resources, the total economic damage exceeds billions of Birr. But as we emphasize, money cannot fully capture the loss; ecosystems take decades to recover, and some may never return to their original state.

‎Can you provide an overview of the different departments involved in the research? How many research departments exist, what are their specific areas of focus, and what do the findings in Volume One reflect? Do you believe CITG can cover the full scope of the damage?

Yes, the departments that exist,almost all of them, are supposed to cover the full scope of the damage in this context. From the beginning, there were five large research centers, and within them, many departments. For example, the first one is the Social Sector Research Center, which covers social services including education and health. Another is the Economy Research Center, which handles all types of economic productivity, from household to agricultural, from farm level to big manufacturing—they are all interrelated. Another is the Infrastructure Center, which covers all research related to telecommunications and infrastructure. Then there is the Gender Research Center, which specifically addresses gender-based violence. Another is the Humanitarian Center, which, until now, has not produced anything, but it focuses on humanitarian activities. These research centers have many departments, including natural resources and environment. Each is a separate research center. All of these together aim to provide a holistic account of damages. Therefore, it was mandatory to cover everything. Now, regarding the initial indicators obtained, what do they reflect? In Volume One, the indication is not exhaustive—it shows systematically, as a conclusion, not only the genocide aspect but also previous findings, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Overall, the current conclusions largely reflect this.

How independent is CITG in practice? How can we verify that it is working independently?

The institution was established by the Tigray regional council. It is an independent commission, objectively structured, designed to operate without interference. It was established by law, which means independent professionals were assigned to it. Everyone agrees on this structure, though dialogue continues on points of disagreement. The main purpose now is to properly hold the data at the current level of independence. After that, the findings will follow proper scientific procedures, and any research institution or archive can enter this data, scientifically verify it, or add another type of finding.

Does Volume One contain estimates for the time and resources required for reconstruction?

No, the reconstruction base is handled by another body. The damage account we have created can be used to propose reconstruction, but this is volatile and may take years to complete. Separate commissions, for example a separate Reconstruction Commission, could be structured to handle this. As for us, during this period, we are continuously updating the records. The data is collected and prepared, making it usable for reconstruction.

Parts of Tigray were not included in the findings published by the Commission so far. How will CITG incorporate these areas into its future research?

‎The Commission itself cannot determine that. Within the limited time frame set for the Commission, it can add these matters or choose another option to proceed. But this is not a decision left to CITG.

‎What resources—time, funding, and manpower—do you think CITG will need to continue its work?

The work will require a significant amount of all that you just mentioned. It is not small. Data collectors and volunteers have been engaged, and supervisors number in the hundreds or thousands. Therefore, what we currently have will be provided in parts. It is not a question of financial resources alone but also physical plans, which will be implemented via volunteering.

‎How do you see the future? Is rehabilitation a realistic possibility in these areas?

‎Rehabilitation is possible but will require massive coordinated effort. It’s not something that one regional bureau or NGO can handle alone.

‎We propose a four-phase strategy: emergency stabilization—preventing further erosion and contamination. ‎Then, ecological restoration or replanting, soil conservation, and reforestation, followed by community livelihood recovery—supporting farmers to return safely—as well as sustainable monitoring through establishing local environmental watch programs.

‎The key is to integrate environmental recovery into peacebuilding. If communities see their land and water restored, they regain a sense of dignity and ownership. Environmental repair is therefore also social healing.

Based on the results published so far, what are your general recommendations?

‎Well, perhaps I am speaking from my own limited focus, but from what we have observed in the region so far, it has been heavily affected, more than one would imagine. We know that various damages exist in this area. However, this cannot be compelled or addressed all at once in a single step.

Secondly, regarding the scope and type of the damage, it is very diversified, and therefore, in terms of capacity, it can be reconstructed gradually. Also, these recommendations can be implemented, but I do not think that the country alone or even local communities can do it by themselves. Everyone must collectively follow these recommendations, ensure the findings of the studies are properly implemented, and manage the area so that it can recover from this damage.

‎However, it is clear that, as in any situation, one cannot remain silent and do nothing. The international community should act appropriately, just as the global community would in the case of environmental achievements. The damage is of global concern, and everyone should participate in monitoring and addressing it. It is critical that recommendations are carried out properly. If this is not done, there is a risk of relapse, which could undermine peace and stability. If these issues are not addressed and the reconstruction pathway is not followed, any development efforts will fail. Past relapses have been caused by technical issues, security issues, governance issues, environmental degradation, and climate change impacts.

‎And, indeed, within our own means, we must take responsibility and continue our work diligently.